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THE CONTRADICTORY STANCE ON JURY NULLIFICATION
KENNETH DUVALL*

ABSTRACT
Arguments about jury nullification in both courts and academia
typically proceed under the assumption that either proponents or opponents
of nullification could decisively carry the day. But as current Supreme
Court precedent stands, jury nullification is both prohibited and protected in
a unique way. This Article shines a light on the uneasy, confusing
compromise in the doctrines that prohibit and protect jury nullification, and
finds the two ways out of this seemingly contradictory stance – fully
embracing nullification, or rejecting it – are equally taboo to the American
legal mind.
If the Supreme Court is sincere in condemning nullification, the Court
would stamp out the practice by allowing jury control devices in criminal
proceedings. Conversely, if the Court is determined to honestly sanction
nullification, it would justify the currently incoherent ban on criminal jury
controls. However, based on examinations of the Court’s current make-up
and the entrenched positions on both sides, this Article contends the Court
will not bring itself to either encroach on the jury or openly endorse
nullification. Instead, the contradiction at the heart of this issue will
continue to exist as a frozen conflict, awaiting a thaw that is unlikely to
come.
Part II briefly explains the contested history of nullification. Part III
examines modern courts’ intermittent recognition of nullification. Part IV
expounds upon the laws defining and impacting criminal jury nullification.
Part V grapples with the revelation that the prohibition on criminal jury
control mechanisms, such as directed verdicts, serve only to protect and
allow nullification. Finally, Part VI concludes by examining the three ways
in which this muddled and contradictory area of the law may evolve.

* Kenneth Duvall graduated from the University of Virginia School of Law and is currently
an Associate with the law firm of Berkowitz Oliver Williams Shaw & Eisenbrandt LLP in Kansas
City, Missouri. All of the usual caveats that one would expect to apply are in full force: my
views are not those of the firm. Also, thank you to my lovely wife Kelly who was patient during
this process in allowing me to stay late at work on occasion to work on this Article.
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INTRODUCTION

Jury nullification has long fascinated courts, academics, and society in
general.1 The power, or maybe even right, of a jury to either convict or
acquit a criminal defendant, despite the jury’s belief that the law and
evidence demand a contrary result, has stirred controversy since its
inception, and continues to polarize. As it currently stands, nullification
occupies a position in the twilight, officially condemned by the United
States Supreme Court,2 yet allowed – even encouraged – to survive by
various, unyielding protections of jury decision-making. Echoing the
sentiments of courts around the country, juries undoubtedly have no right to
nullify, but they also surely have the power to do so, as no one, not even the
judge, is allowed to do much to control a rogue jury in a criminal trial.3
Part II will briefly outline the history of nullification in AngloAmerican jurisprudence, including modern developments. Part III then
focuses on the various manifestations of nullification in modern legal
contexts, and finds, that while in most instances nullification is treated as if
it did not exist, it is recognized to exist in a couple of limited contexts.
Reflecting on the contemporary treatment of nullification, Part IV focuses
on the twin questions of whether nullification is, under Supreme Court
1. See generally CLAY S. CONRAD, JURY NULLIFICATION: THE EVOLUTION OF A DOCTRINE
(1998).
2. Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 101 (1895).
3. Peter Westen & Richard Drubel, Toward a General Theory of Double Jeopardy, 1978
SUP. CT. REV. 81, 131-32.
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precedent, truly legal, and whether nullification should be legal. Finally,
based on the answer to the descriptive question in Part IV, Part V assesses
the consequences of nullification’s current legal status, finding a startling
consequence. Namely, judges in criminal cases should be allowed to
control juries through devices like directed verdicts if the judiciary really
means what it says when it declares jury nullification illegal.
Conversely, if one follows the rationale for jury protection devices to
its terminal end, then it appears nullification may be a constitutional right.
It is this tension that clouds nullification jurisprudence and calls out for
resolution. Yet this Article settles on the forecast that this frozen conflict
between pro- and anti- nullification advocates will not thaw anytime soon,
leaving American courts perpetually locked in a position where nullification
is openly condemned and surreptitiously fostered.
II. HISTORY OF NULLIFICATION
Most histories of jury nullification begin with Bushell’s Case.4 Up
until this precedent, courts in England had apparently exercised significant
control over jury decision-making.5 As a result of Bushell’s Case,
nullification came into being, and would cross the ocean to the colonies. 6
In Bushell’s Case, the English Crown prosecuted William Penn and
William Mead for congregating to discuss a religion besides that of the
Church of England.7 The judge was convinced the verdict should be guilty,
but the jury refused to convict.8 After the jury refused for the third time, the
judge jailed the jury for contempt.9 However, the petition for writ of habeas
corpus by one of the jurors was granted by Judge Vaughan, as he found that
no juror could be punished for rendering a verdict contrary to the court’s
opinion.10
According to many scholars, the majority of Founding Fathers were in
agreement with Judge Vaughan.11 Approval of the jury’s right to nullify is
found in “the writings of some of the most eminent American lawyers of
the age – Jefferson, Adams, Wilson, Iredell, and Kent, to mention just a
4. Bushell’s Case, (1610) 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (C.P.) 1006.
5. Jon P. McClanahan, Citizen Participation in Japanese Criminal Trials: Reimagining the
Right to Trial by Jury in the United States, 37 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 725, 731-32 (2012).
6. United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
7. McClanahan, supra note 5, at 731.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. For a collection of the various views on nullification – for, against, and somewhere inbetween – , see Roger Roots, The Rise and Fall of the American Jury, 8 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 1,
33-42 apps. A-C (2011).
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few.”12 Thus, it was not only Anti-Federalists who sought to use the jury as
a check against the government,13 but also well-established Federalists,14
including even the first Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, John Jay.15
Many modern cases refer to this distinguished history flowing from
Bushell’s Case through the Founding period in defending the practice of
nullification.16 Others argue, while “nullification” was alive and well at the
Founding in some form, the “nullification” of this era was always tempered
by the duty of juries to heed both the law and the judge; in other words,
while the jury may have interpreted the law on its own, it was still under a
duty to do so in a conscientious fashion.17
Whatever the exact contours of the right to nullify at the Founding,
momentum would turn in the other direction as the legislature earned more
trust from society, precluding the need for juries to defy statutes.18 In
United States v. Battiste,19 the first significant blow to nullification came.20
Writing for the majority, Justice Story stated the jury must accept the law as
given by the judge.21 In another famous case, United States v. Morris,22 the
federal district court of Massachusetts interrupted defense counsel during a
nullification argument to the jury, holding juries have no right to pass on
legal questions.23 The issue in federal courts was settled firmly against
12. AKHIL R. AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 101 (1998).
13. Roots, supra note 11, at 14 (noting that Anti-Federalist proponents of a powerful jury
included Luther Martin, Arthur Lee (Cincinnatus), and the Federal Farmer).
14. Simon Stern, Note, Between Local Knowledge and National Politics: Debating
Rationales for Jury Nullification After Bushell’s Case, 111 YALE L.J. 1815, 1859 (2002).
15. Christopher C. Schwan, Comment, Right up to the Line: The Ethics of Advancing
Nullification Arguments to the Jury, 29 J. LEGAL PROF. 293, 294 (2005)) (“[Y]ou [the jury] have
nevertheless a right to take upon yourselves to judge of both, and to determine the law as well as
the fact in controversy.” (citing Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 U.S. 1, 4 (1794)).
16. United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1131 n.34 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
17. See Lars Noah, Civil Jury Nullification, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1601, 1620 (2001) (“Although
Eighteenth Century juries were invited to find both law and facts and not feel bound by the
interpretation of the law offered by trial judges, they were admonished to apply the law as they
understood it. The independence of jurors in this regard did not countenance deciding disputes in
total disregard of the applicable common or other law.”); David A. Stern, Nullifying History:
Modern-Day Misuse of the Right to Decide the Law, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 599, 609 (2000)
(“[T]he right to decide the law was neither equivalent to today’s proposed right to nullify, nor did
it encompass the right to nullify. To the contrary, the right to decide the law swept narrowly,
placing a clear duty on juries to follow the law as they saw it, rather than reject the law as pronullification scholars would have them do.” (emphasis in original)).
18. Dougherty, 473 F.2d at 1132 (“[T]he protection of citizens [lies] not in recognizing the
right of each jury to make its own law, but in following democratic processes for changing the
law.”).
19. 24 F. Cas. 1042 (C.C.D. Mass. 1835) (No. 14,545).
20. Battiste, 24 F. Cas. at 1043.
21. See Schwan, supra note 15, at 294.
22. 26 F. Cas. 1323 (C.C.D. Mass. 1851) (No. 15,815).
23. Morris, 24 F. Cas. at 1328.
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nullification in Sparf v. United States.24 As such, all of the federal circuits
have since fallen in line, agreeing, “[w]hile juries have the power to ignore
the law in their verdicts, courts have no obligation to tell them they may do
so.”25 As far as state courts are concerned, they are, for the most part, in
accord with the federal courts. A few exceptions, like Maryland,26
Indiana,27 and Georgia28 tell jurors that they are to determine the law as
well as the facts, though they do not expressly allow for an instruction
sanctioning the right to nullify.
Despite the official judicial consensus against jury nullification, the
practice continues, and courts proclaim their inability to rein in runaway
juries.29 The common justification for this incongruous arrangement is that
nullification serves a valid purpose, but to acknowledge it directly would
allow it to run amok.30 This uneasy balance is often challenged in
academia, especially by proponents of nullification who would like it to be
placed back in the light and acknowledged as a right of the defendant, and
maybe even the jurors.31 However, the courts seem content to allow the
nullification doctrine to remain exactly where it is: in the twilight.

24. 156 U.S. 51, 102 (1895).
25. See United States v. Edwards, 101 F.3d 17, 19-20 (2d Cir. 1996) (collecting circuit
cases).
26. MD. CONST. Declaration of Right, art. 23 (“In the trial of all criminal cases, the Jury shall
be the Judges of Law, as well as of fact, except that the Court may pass upon the sufficiency of the
evidence to sustain a conviction.”); see also Wyley v. Warden, 372 F.2d 742, 747 (4th Cir. 1967)
(rejecting defendant’s claim that Maryland’s nullification provision is illegal under the Federal
Constitution). Wyley was later overruled on the ground that any instruction that relieves the State
of the burden of proving elements beyond a reasonable doubt is not harmless error, i.e., merits
automatic reversal. Jenkins v. Hutchinson, 221 F.3d 679, 685-86 (4th Cir. 2000) (citing Sullivan
v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 278-82 (1993)).
27. IND. CONST. art. I, § 19 (“In all criminal cases whatever, the jury shall have the right to
determine the law and the facts.”); see also Bridgewater v. State, 55 N.E. 737, 739 (Ind. 1899).
The Indiana Supreme Court found that it was not error for trial judge to refuse to instruct jury that
the judge’s instructions on the law were advisory only and may be disregarded so that the jury
could determine the law for itself. Id. While the court did not say a trial judge would commit
error by giving such an instruction, it at least spoke strongly against doing so. Id.
28. GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, ¶ 11(a) (“In criminal cases . . . the jury shall be the judges of the
law and the facts.”). For further discussion of constitutional recognition of jury nullification
powers in Maryland, Indiana, and Georgia, see Richard St. John, License to Nullify: The
Democratic and Constitutional Deficiencies of Authorized Jury Lawmaking, 106 YALE L.J. 2563,
2566-74 (1997). Credit to Jeffrey Zahler, Note, Allowing Defendants to Present Evidence of
Prison Conditions to Convince Juries to Nullify: Can Only the Prosecutor Present “Moral”
Evidence?, 34 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 485, 494 n.63-66 (2008), for
collecting these state provisions.
29. Horning v. District of Columbia, 254 U.S. 135, 138 (1920) (“[T]he jury has the power to
bring in a verdict in the teeth of both law and facts.”).
30. United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1134-35 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
31. Id. at 1138 (Bazelon, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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III. MODERN TREATMENT OF NULLIFICATION
IN VARIOUS CONTEXTS
This Article now turns to the contemporary treatment of nullification in
certain, concrete legal settings. As noted in Part II, the current consensus is
that nullification should not be openly recognized, but there are a few
instances wherein nullification is at least acknowledged, and sometimes
even grudgingly accepted by courts.32 This Part will examine a few
instances demonstrating the general rule that nullification is not recognized,
followed by a couple specific exceptions to this rule.
A. NULLIFICATION NOT RECOGNIZED IN MOST CIRCUMSTANCES
The following examples illustrate the general rule regarding
nullification’s current status in American jurisprudence: jury nullification
is invalid. The first example is the bar against presenting nullification to a
jury. A second is the unwillingness of courts to consider the possibility of
nullification in granting post-conviction relief. Finally, the third is the
willingness of courts to preclude nullifying venire persons from becoming
jurors.
1.

Jury Instructions

The most salient demonstration of the prohibition against nullification
is the ban on instructing juries about their power to nullify. Across the
country, courts cannot instruct juries about their power to nullify.33
Moreover, as noted earlier, defense counsel cannot advance nullification
arguments.34 Instead, standard jury instructions direct the jury to apply the
law before them, which is a tacit means of discouraging nullification.35
2.

Post-Conviction Relief

Similarly, in the post-conviction relief context, courts cannot consider
the possibility the movants were prejudiced by the alleged failure of their
32. See infra Part III.B.
33. Nancy Gertner, From “Rites” to “Rights”: The Decline of the Criminal Jury Trial, 24
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 433, 435 n.10 (2012) (collecting cases).
34. NANCY GERTNER & JUDITH H. MIZNER, THE LAW OF JURIES 197 (2d ed. 2009)
(“Concomitant with the refusal to instruct the jury concerning nullification, courts have further
held that counsel may not argue that theory in closing argument. . . .”); Roots, supra note 11, at
15-16 (“Many judges will not even allow a defense attorney to argue for nullification (or even to
inform jurors of their power to nullify) during closing arguments.”) (collecting cases).
35. Todd E. Pettys, Evidentiary Relevance, Morally Reasonable Verdicts, and Jury
Nullification, 86 IOWA L. REV. 467, 503 (2001) (“[T]he courts consistently hold that criminal
juries should be instructed that it is their duty to apply the law as defined by the trial court, and
that defendants’ requests for an instruction on juries’ power of nullification should be denied.”).
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counsel to prevail based on a jury’s merciful nullification. The lodestar of
post-conviction jurisprudence, Strickland v. Washington36, so held:
In making the determination whether the specified errors resulted
in the required prejudice, a court should presume, absent challenge
to the judgment on grounds of evidentiary insufficiency, that the
judge or jury acted according to law. An assessment of the
likelihood of a result more favorable to the defendant must exclude
the possibility of arbitrariness, whimsy, caprice, “nullification,”
and the like. A defendant has no entitlement to the luck of a
lawless decisionmaker, even if a lawless decision cannot be
reviewed. The assessment of prejudice should proceed on the
assumption that the decisionmaker is reasonably, conscientiously,
and impartially applying the standards that govern the decision. It
should not depend on the idiosyncrasies of the particular
decisionmaker, such as unusual propensities toward harshness or
leniency. Although these factors may actually have entered into
counsel’s selection of strategies and, to that limited extent, may
thus affect the performance inquiry, they are irrelevant to the
prejudice inquiry. Thus, evidence about the actual process of
decision, if not part of the record of the proceeding under review,
and evidence about, for example, a particular judge’s sentencing
practices, should not be considered in the prejudice
determination.37
Therefore, just as trial courts will prohibit defense counsel from arguing
nullification to the jury, appellate courts will not consider the possibility
that the jury nullified, presenting a form of doctrinal symmetry and
consistency in an area of the law often fraught with contradiction.
3.

Exclusion of Nullifying Jurors

As a final example of the general rule, courts are forthright about the
illegality of nullification when it comes to whether jurors with a penchant
for nullifying can be struck during voir dire: the answer is a clear yes.
“[C]ourts have excluded potential nullifiers from the jury before or even
during trial.”38 This general rule, though, is subject to one limited, but
important, exception, discussed further in Section B.

36. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
37. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694-95 (emphasis added).
38. Noah, supra note 17, at 1621-22 (collecting cases).
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B. NULLIFICATION RECOGNIZED IN LIMITED CIRCUMSTANCES
In contrast to these examples demonstrating the rule, there are at least
two situations in which nullification is recognized, if not justified. The first
example is when juries return inconsistent verdicts. A second example is
when juries are deliberating in the sentencing phase of a death penalty case.
1.

Inconsistent Verdicts

The first situation requiring examination is when appellate courts must
explain an inconsistent verdict. The leading case in the area is United
States v. Powell.39 In Powell, the Supreme Court declared:
The rule that the defendant may not upset such a verdict embodies
a prudent acknowledgment of a number of factors. First, as the
above quote suggests, inconsistent verdicts – even verdicts that
acquit on a predicate offense while convicting on the compound
offense – should not necessarily be interpreted as a windfall to the
Government at the defendant’s expense. It is equally possible that
the jury, convinced of guilt, properly reached its conclusion on the
compound offense, and then through mistake, compromise, or
lenity, arrived at an inconsistent conclusion on the lesser offense.
But in such situations the Government has no recourse if it wishes
to correct the jury’s error; the Government is precluded from
appealing or otherwise upsetting such an acquittal by the
Constitution’s Double Jeopardy Clause.40
Thus, there are two possibilities with an inconsistent verdict: the jury was
convinced of guilt as to both charges but was lenient as to one charge, or
the jury was convinced of innocence as to both charges but was vindictive
as to one charge.41 Given both the impossibility of knowing which type of
nullification occurred and the inability of the State to remedy a lenient
nullification due to the Double Jeopardy Clause,42 the Court decided to
simply allow the verdict.43 Under this reasoning, a nullification of one kind
or another stood as valid.44 The Court, however, did not base its holding
simply on this rationale of indeterminacy and fairness to both parties.45

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

469 U.S. 57 (1984).
Powell, 469 U.S. at 65.
See generally id.
Id. at 65.
Id. at 69.
Id. at 65.
Id.
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Besides placing the defendant on a level playing field with the
Government such that neither can appeal the pertinent inconsistent verdict,
the Court further justified letting the verdicts stand because doing so simply
recognizes the historic function of the jury.46 The Court stopped short of
justifying its holding simply based on the power of the jury to nullify,
though, relying on both fairness and the role of the jury.47 As the Court
stated: “[t]he fact that the inconsistency may be the result of lenity, coupled
with the Government’s inability to invoke review, suggests that inconsistent
verdicts should not be reviewable.”48 The Court’s hesitation to ground its
holding exclusively on the power to nullify stemmed from its continued
ambivalence on the topic. Despite recognizing its historic function, the
Court also reiterated its mantra in Sparf that “the jury has no right to
exercise” the power of nullification.49
Therefore, inconsistent verdicts are not justified merely because they
exemplify jury nullification.50 If the Government could challenge the
acquittal half of the inconsistent verdict equation as lenient nullification,
then conceivably the court would allow the defendant to challenge the
conviction half of the equation, and thereby refuse to acknowledge
nullification. This is, after all, what occurs in civil cases with inconsistent
verdicts,51 and if the Double Jeopardy Clause was not a factor in criminal
cases, it is possible the Supreme Court would not find arguments in favor of
jury nullification sufficient to allow inconsistent criminal verdicts to stand.
In sum, while one could initially believe Powell is evidence of the Court’s
sanction of nullification, a closer reading reveals a more ambiguous
picture.52

46. Id.
47. Some commentators have claimed that the Supreme Court, by allowing inconsistent
verdicts, has effectively sanctioned the jury’s power to nullify. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow,
Recharging the Jury: The Criminal Jury’s Constitutional Role in an Era of Mandatory
Sentencing, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 33, 81-82 (2003); Noah, supra note 17, at 1633 n.120; Albert W.
Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire Peremptory Challenges, and the Review of
Jury Verdicts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 212-14 (1989); Alexander M. Bickel, Judge and Jury Inconsistent Verdicts in the Federal Courts, 63 HARV. L. REV. 649, 651-52 (1950).
48. Powell, 469 U.S. at 66 (emphasis added).
49. Id. (quoting Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 393 (1932)).
50. Id.
51. Noah, supra note 17, at 1633 (“The civil jury has no power to dispense clemency, and
verdicts in the teeth of the evidence may be set right.” (quoting Will v. Comprehensive Acct.
Corp., 776 F.2d 665, 677 (7th Cir. 1985))); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 50(b); see also, e.g., Kristen
K. Sauer, Note, Informed Conviction: Instructing the Jury About Mandatory Sentencing
Consequences, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1232, 1251 (1995) (citing Neely v. Martin K. Eby Constr. Co.,
386 U.S. 317, 322 (1967) (upholding judgment notwithstanding the verdict against Seventh
Amendment challenge)).
52. See generally Powell, 469 U.S. at 66.
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Death Penalty Sentencing Phase

Another example of a measured authorization of nullification is in the
death penalty context, as the Supreme Court has disallowed the striking of
nullifying jurors in death penalty sentencing.53 Although (as noted above)
the Supreme Court allows lower courts to screen would-be nullifying jurors
from the guilt phase,54 the Court has also indicated that such jurors cannot
be screened from the sentencing phase.55 The reasoning is such that, if
nullification should be recognized at all, it should be recognized at the
moment when a jury can, through its mercy, preserve life.56 Thus, in Gregg
v. Georgia,57 a plurality of the Court stated a mandatory death penalty
scheme would be unconstitutional in part because it would not permit “the
discretionary act of jury nullification.”58 “[T]he sentencer must enjoy
unconstrained discretion to decide whether any sympathetic factors bearing
on the defendant or the crime indicate that he does not ‘deserve to be
sentenced to death.’”59 In another mandatory death penalty scheme case,
Woodson v. North Carolina,60 a Court plurality again struck down the
scheme, this time noting the statute in question had no means of guiding the
jury’s “inevitable exercise of the power to determine which first-degree
murders shall live and which shall die . . . . [A] mandatory scheme may
well exacerbate the problem identified in Furman by resting the penalty
determination on the particular jury’s willingness to act lawlessly.”61 The
Court openly granted that some juries inexorably will nullify, and, at least
in the context of life and death, found that this power to nullify should be
standardized as much as possible by bifurcating the guilt and sentencing
phases so that merciful nullifying jurors can focus their energies on the
sentencing phase alone.62
Taken together, these two instances – inconsistent verdicts and death
penalty sentencing – appear only as outliers in the general attitude towards
nullification. The recognition of nullification in the inconsistent verdict

53. James S. Liebman & Lawrence C. Marshall, Less Is Better: Justice Stevens and the
Narrowed Death Penalty, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1607, 1623 (2006).
54. Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 177 (1986) (“‘[D]eath qualification’ does not violate
the fair-cross-section requirement.”).
55. Liebman & Marshall, supra note 53, at 1623.
56. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 199 (1976).
57. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
58. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 199 n.50.
59. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 664 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment) (citation omitted)).
60. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
61. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 303.
62. See id.
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context is a result of the unique features of Double Jeopardy concerns.
Similarly, acknowledgment of nullification in the death penalty context
occurs only because of the exceptional stakes involved.
IV. “POWER” VERSUS “RIGHT”
As the result of a back and forth battle over jury nullification lasting
centuries, different courts and jurisdictions remain maligned over the issue.
Although courts currently disagree over their power and control over jury
nullification as well as the role it plays in the criminal justice system, the
United States Supreme Court has attempted to resolve these issues. In order
to understand the current role of jury nullification, we must parse the
language of the Supreme Court, which has in fact stated nullification is an
illegal act by the jury, and yet curiously capitulates to the jury’s capacity to
nullify at will.
A. DESCRIPTIVE ISSUE: NULLIFICATION IS AN ILLEGAL POWER,
NOT A LEGAL RIGHT
No matter what one’s position is on the virtues and vices of
nullification, current case law is clear that, under Sparf, juries are under a
legal duty to follow the law, thereby rendering any act of nullification
illegal.63 Specifically, Sparf explains “[t]he law makes it the duty of the
jury to return a verdict according to the evidence in the particular case
before them.”64 The “power” is recognized because no one can control the
jury; this is power in the raw, illegal sense. As Justice Holmes clarified, a
quarter century after Sparf, in Horning v. District of Columbia65:
[T]he judge cannot direct a verdict it is true, and the jury has the
power to bring in a verdict in the teeth of both law and facts. . . .
[T]he judge always has the right and duty to tell them what the law
is upon this or that state of facts that may be found . . . but the jury
were allowed the technical right, if it can be called so, to decide
against the law and the facts.66
In some contexts, power can mean the “legal right or authorization to act or
not act; a person’s or organization’s ability to alter, by an act of will, the
63. Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 99 (1895).
64. Id.
65. 254 U.S. 135 (1920).
66. Horning, 254 U.S. at 138. Although Horning was not explicitly invoking the Hohfeldian
common law distinctions of common law relationships, which included rights and powers,
reference to Hohfeld shows that a right is not the same thing as a power. See Wesley Newcomb
Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710,
718-20 (1917).
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rights, duties, liabilities, or other legal relations either of that person or
another.”67 Justices Harlan (in Sparf) and Holmes (in Horning) noted the
jury has the duty to follow the law as instructed by the judge,68 or, in other
words, “no right to exercise” the power of nullification.69 Therefore, it is
clear the jury’s power to nullify is not an actual right to nullify.70 Rather,
the power of the jury to nullify must mean the sheer ability to do so
regardless of its legality.71 In this fashion, courts of last resort have the
power to render decisions in the teeth of the law because of the lack of
review of their decisions, but this does not necessarily give them a legal
imprimatur.
B. NORMATIVE ISSUE: SHOULD NULLIFICATION BE LEGAL?
Unlike much of the writing dedicated to the topic of nullification, this
Article is not necessarily concerned with whether nullification should or
should not be legal, but instead with the fallout from the current decision of
courts that nullification is illegal. Still, this Article would be remiss if it did
not concisely account for the arguments raging on each side of the issue, as
the effects of attaining doctrinal consistency would inure to the benefit of
one faction at the expense of the other.
Put simply, the debate over the legitimacy of jury nullification can be
broken down into two camps. One group views nullification as a
“[f]undamental necessity of a democratic system.”72 In contrast, others
view nullification as “a sick doctrine that has occasional good days?”73
The following are common arguments in favor of nullification. Some
contend that, if prosecutorial discretion is valid, why not jury
nullification?74 Others justify nullification because it provides just the right

67. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (definition of “power”).
68. Sparf, 156 U.S. at 106 (“[I]t was the duty of the court to expound the law, and that of the
jury to apply the law as thus declared to the facts as ascertained by them.” (emphasis added));
Horning, 254 U.S. at 138 (“The facts were not in dispute, and what he did was to say so and to lay
down the law applicable to them. In such a case obviously the function of the jury if they do their
duty is little more than formal.” (emphasis added)).
69. Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 393 (1932).
70. As noted in the text, Justice Holmes made sure to qualify the jury’s “right” to nullify in
two ways: first, by limiting the “right” with the narrow adjective “technical;” and second, by
tempering even that measured phrase with the skeptical description “if it can be called so.”
Horning, 254 U.S. at 139.
71. Id. at 138.
72. United States v. Moylan, 417 F.2d 1002, 1005 (4th Cir. 1969).
73. People v. Dillon, 668 P.2d 697, 730 (1983) (Kraus, J., concurring).
74. Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Prosecutorial Nullification, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1243, 1247 n.17
(2011).
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amount of nullification.75 Along these lines, proponents claim open
recognition of nullification would not unleash more “bad” versions of
nullification, but instead more “good” versions; because those who nullify
without being told they can are ignoring the rules, while those who would
nullify when being told would be following the rules.76 Yet others find
nullification to be the only means of protecting the community in some
instances,77 or community values in other instances.78 Similarly, juries can
counterbalance against institutional actors: legislators, judges, prosecutors,
and police.79 Of course, many would uphold jury nullification because of
the claimed historical right of juries to do so,80 and because it seemingly
follows from the Double Jeopardy Clause.81 In addition, juries, unlike the
legislatures crafting the laws, can respond to unanticipated situations.82
Regarding arguments raised against nullification, the chief one may be
that nullification invites anarchy.83 After all, the United States aspires to be
a government of laws, not men.84 Moreover, the judge is the courtroom’s
expert on legal matters.85 In a retort to the democracy-enhancing virtue of
nullification, nullification opponents claim that nullification undermines the

75. See, e.g., United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1134 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (“An
equilibrium has evolved – an often marvelous balance – with the jury acting as a ‘safety valve’ for
exceptional cases, without being a wildcat or runaway institution. There is reason to believe that
the simultaneous achievement of modest jury equity and avoidance of intolerable caprice depends
on formal instructions that do not expressly delineate a jury charter to carve out its own rules of
law.”).
76. Id. at 1141 (Bazelon, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
77. Otis B. Grant, Rational Choice or Wrongful Discrimination? The Law and Economics of
Jury Nullification, 14 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 145, 185-86 (2004) (“Beyond optimal deterrence,
however, jury nullification may be a solution to racism and discrimination in the criminal justice
system. As a rational choice, jury nullification can encourage socially desirable behavior and
discourage undesirable conduct by the police.”).
78. Gregory Mitchell, Comment, Against “Overwhelming” Appellate Activism:
Constraining Harmless Error Review, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1335, 1355 (1994).
79. Dougherty, 473 F.2d at 1138 & n.13; David C. Brody, Sparf and Dougherty Revisited:
Why the Court Should Instruct the Jury of its Nullification Right, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 89, 92
(1995).
80. Brody, supra note 79, at 92.
81. The Supreme Court may have suggested this in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318
(1979) (“[T]he factfinder in a criminal case has traditionally been permitted to enter an
unassailable but unreasonable verdict of ‘not guilty.’ This is the logical corollary of the rule that
there can be no appeal from a judgment of acquittal, even if the evidence of guilt is
overwhelming.”). I am supposing that the “rule that there can be no appeal from a judgment of
acquittal” refers, directly or indirectly, to the Double Jeopardy Clause. Id.
82. Dougherty, 473 F.2d at 1142; Brody, supra note 79, at 92.
83. See, e.g., Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 101 (1895); Dougherty, 473 F.2d at 1133;
Brody, supra note 79, at 92.
84. See, e.g., United States v. Luisi, 568 F. Supp. 2d 106, 120 (D. Mass. 2008).
85. See, e.g., United States v. Urfer, 287 F.3d 663, 665 (7th Cir. 2002).
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popular will expressed through laws.86 Nullification may also violate the
defendant’s rights,87 and, from at least one point of view, results in unjust
verdicts.88 Instructing on nullification might even overwhelm jurors
already stressed with their heavy civic responsibility.89
Enough ink has been spilled in both directions that this Article need not
pile onto the normative issue. However, an unbiased observer likely grants
that both sides have valid points, and following from this recognition, one
can understand why the debate over nullification remains alive and well.
The inability of either side to settle the question decisively in its favor may
lie at the heart of the uneasy compromise struck by the Supreme Court. As
this Article shortly explores, it may explain why this compromise is likely
to remain in place.
V. IMPLICATIONS FROM RECOGNITION THAT NULLIFICATION
IS ILLEGAL
Current court precedent appears to indicate jury nullification in
criminal trials is illegal. After addressing the formation of jury nullification
and arguments both in favor and against it, this Article must consider a
contradictory stance of jury nullification. The specific contradiction at hand
revolves around judicial mechanisms purporting to protect and honor the
decision of the jury, but which also limit the opportunity for nullification.
A. A LACK OF JUDICIAL SINCERITY
First, this compromise offends one’s moral sense in that the judicial
system should be honest in the role of nullification. If it is illegal, it should
say so in no uncertain terms, or vice versa. When juries ask about
nullification, courts give opaque answers.90 Just as there is value in judges
being sincere and “believ[ing] the reasons they give in their legal
opinions,”91 so too, is there value in ensuring juries are held to the same
standard. Specifically, ensuring juries are doing what they are legally
bound to do does not sound like an unreasonable request. David Shapiro
contends judges should be forthright in dealing with other judicial actors,

86. Brody, supra note 79, at 92; Gary J. Simson, Jury Nullification in the American System:
A Skeptical View, 54 TEX. L. REV. 488, 512 (1976).
87. Brody, supra note 79, at 92; Simson, supra note 86, at 518-19
88. Brody, supra note 79, at 92; Simson, supra note 86, at 518-19.
89. United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1116 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Brody, supra note 79,
at 92.
90. See, e.g., United States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1189 (1st Cir. 1993) (“Federal trial
judges are forbidden to instruct on jury nullification.”).
91. Micah Schwartzman, Judicial Sincerity, 94 VA. L. REV. 987, 987 (2008).
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because a lack of candor implies “the listener is less capable of dealing with
the truth, and thus are of less worth, of respect, than the speaker.”92 This
animating principle of our distaste for dishonesty plays strongly in the
nullification context, as the judiciary’s failure to fully apprise juror’s of
their power to nullify – while simultaneously protecting that power through
sundry prohibitions on jury control devices – could easily be construed as
patronizing.
Arguments in favor of judicial candor are not only based on a sense of
moral obligation. As Scott Idleman argues, there are at least eight more
potential justifications for requiring judges to give an honest account for
their decision-making, ranging from considerations of accountability and
judicial restraint to meeting the needs of the immediate parties and the
development of future precedent.93 While discussions of judicial candor
usually revolve around decisions made by judges (especially at the appellate
level), rather than by juries, the system’s need for judicial candor seems no
less pressing when judges are shaping the decision of the cases indirectly by
informing the jury of their rights and powers, or lack thereof.
Many scholars acknowledge there are exceptions to the general rule
that judicial candor should be required.94 One such example may be: “a
case may present a conflict between fundamental values, in which instance
full candor would require a court to acknowledge that it is sacrificing one of
those values for the sake of the other.”95 Facing such a dilemma, courts
have often downplayed the sacrifice of one value for another because
society would not be able to accept such a result.96 “[S]omething less than
complete candor would be acceptable, according to [Guido] Calabresi,
simply because we place a lesser premium on candor as compared to the
other values at stake in the case.”97 Perhaps the reason that courts are not
candid with juries about their power to nullify is that the judges do not want
92. David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 HARV. L. REV. 731, 736-37
(1987); see also Nicholas S. Zeppos, Judicial Candor and Statutory Interpretation, 78 GEO. L.J.
353, 401-02 (1989) (“[T]he unspoken premise for almost all of the prior calls for candor, is that
deception in judging undermines the integrity of the judiciary. The almost universal
condemnation of lying suggests that those who call for judicial candor have staked out the moral
high ground.”). See generally Chad M. Oldfather, Defining Judicial Inactivism: Models of
Adjudication and the Duty to Decide, 94 GEO. L.J. 121, 155-60 (2005) (discussing the literature
on judicial candor).
93. Scott C. Idleman, A Prudential Theory of Judicial Candor, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1307, 133573 (1995).
94. See Oldfather, supra note 92, at 159-60.
95. Id. at 160.
96. Id. (citing GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE STATUTES 172-73
(1982)).
97. Oldfather, supra note 92, at 160 (quoting GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE
AGE STATUTES 172-73 (1982)).
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to acknowledge to jurors that either the rule of law or the historical power
of the jury (at least in the eyes of some) must give way to the other.
The problem with justifying judicial insincerity on the basis of not
acknowledging the sacrifice of one legal value for another is that many
juries know full well the trade-off at issue, rendering the obfuscation
pointless. Clever juries realize this both because their prerogative lives on
in the dark of the jury room and because the trade-off has not actually been
hidden from society. Opinions such as Sparf addressed the historic claims
of the jury’s nullification rights directly and, rightly or wrongly, denied
them.98 Since Sparf, however, the judiciary has hedged on both sides of the
nullification equation in saying the rule of law is paramount, and yet,
allowing the jury to subvert it.99 Jury nullification has not been sacrificed
because it lives on, if only in the shadows, notwithstanding Sparf.100
Another possible reason to depart from full candor might be the need to
employ “absolute language to describe a legal doctrine or
justification . . . even if not completely accurate, simply because it functions
to neutralize potential slippery-slope problems.”101 For instance, Calabresi
posits we might use absolutist terminology in condemning torture even
though we might recognize extreme circumstances might call for it, or we
might claim there is an absolute prohibition on regulating religion despite
the need to sometimes interfere.102 This reason, more than the previous
one, helps explain the judiciary’s odd dissonance between words and
actions. Dougherty embraces this rationale, reasoning that informing the
jury it cannot nullify sets a rule from which some deviation can be
expected, just as in setting a speed limit.103 Because the rule of law is
paramount, judges unequivocally declare that judges must do their duty
even though they may recognize extreme circumstances might call for a
deviation.
The regime created under Sparf, Horning, and lower cases like
Dougherty may have struck the exact balance that American judges are
content with, and will be satisfied with for centuries to come.104 Perhaps
most interested parties actually desire for some nullification activity to
occurs, but only the limited amount of nullification that occur at the
98. Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 100-01 (1895).
99. Horning v. District of Columbia, 254 U.S. 135, 138-39 (1920).
100. Sparf, 156 U.S. at 106.
101. Oldfather, supra note 92, at 159 (citing GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE
AGE STATUTES 172-73 (1982)).
102. Id.
103. United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d, 1113, 1135 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
104. See Horning, 254 U.S. at 138-39; Sparf, 156 U.S. at 106-07; Dougherty, 473 F.2d at
1136-37.
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margins of a regime banning the practice. This compromise position is
explored further in Part V.B.2.
While this slippery slope, pro-compromise reason may help explain the
judiciary’s behavior, it does not necessarily justify it. First, how does the
judiciary know the level of jury nullification associated by this regime is
optimum, i.e., that the juries will know the extreme cases warranting
deviation from the rule when they see them? The nullifying juries in such a
system are, after all, breaking the law.105 Furthermore, one must assume
slippery-slope issues are a real problem, at least in this instance, which is
not necessarily the case. If juries are told they have the power to nullify,
critics assume nullification would occur too often, and in the wrong cases.
Upon empirical study, though, this “chaos theory” has received only mixed
reviews.106 Many earlier studies found nullification instructions did not
unleash any such chaos,107 as juries tended to nullify only in arguably
warranted, merciful fashion,108 and, by and large, the social science on the
issue still “shows that jurors do use information about their power to nullify
in a circumscribed and careful manner.”109 If the judiciary actually believes
some nullification is necessary and proper, these reasons could be used to
support a candid embrace of nullification, even through jury instructions, a
possibility considered in Part V.B.1.
Finally, returning to the doctrinal emphasis of this Article, justifying
the judiciary’s inconsistent words and actions because of slippery-slope
considerations is problematic, because the Supreme Court labeling jury
nullification as illegal does not contain exceptions.110 Thus, the intention of
compromising on candidness regarding a rule of law to avoid slippery slope
issues, is to avoid creating any exceptions as a matter of law, so that the
only exceptions that do occur are rogue and, as such, rare. But the rule laid
down in Sparf is not just any rule of law; instead, the behavior of the jury is
the lynchpin of the entire criminal adjudication system. The jury has the

105. Horning, 254 U.S at 138.
106. Irwin A. Horowitz, Jury Nullification: An Empirical Perspective, 28 N. ILL. U. L. REV.
425, 449 (2008) (“[W]hile a considerable body of prior research [has] contradicted the Dougherty
court’s chaos theory . . . recent findings support a narrow version of that theory: that nullification
instructions can exacerbate a certain kind of juror bias (emotional biases) in a certain kind of case
(one in which the fairness of the law is in question). But those findings also left open an
important possibility – that differently worded instructions might mitigate the bias-enhancing
effect of instructions informing jurors that they could nullify.”).
107. Julie Seaman, Black Boxes: fMRI Lie Detection and the Role of the Jury, 42 AKRON L.
REV. 931, 938 (2009) (citing Irwin A. Horowitz et al., Chaos in the Courtroom Reconsidered:
Emotional Bias and Juror Nullification, 30 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 163, 165-66 (2006)).
108. Horowitz, supra note 106, at 450.
109. Id.
110. Horning, 254 U.S. at 138-39; Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 105-06 (1895).
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power to validate or invalidate all of the legal process leading up to its
verdict, and any compromise of the jury compromises every other feature of
criminal justice. If the judiciary means to build in exceptions to its antinullifying jury instructions through its other behavior in preventing jury
control mechanisms in criminal trials, then it is undercutting its own
precedent. Moreover, even though most empirical studies of jury behavior
have shown jurors, aware of their ability to nullify, have not abused this
power, some recent research has shown “caution is warranted with respect
to informing juries of their nullification powers, at least in trials where
emotionally-biasing information is intrinsic to the trial.”111 These reasons
correspond with the possibility of courts fully embracing the antinullification principle of Sparf.
B. THE JUDICIARY PROTECTS AN ILLEGAL POWER IN NULLIFICATION
If a call for jury sincerity is not enough to push the judicial system into
controlling rogue criminal juries, then perhaps doctrinal consistency should
be. Upon examination, many safeguards put in place long ago to protect the
right or power to nullify remain even though nullification is, if Sparf,
Horning and company are taken at face value, no longer worthy of legal
protection.112 First, this section will explain the circular logic of the power
to nullify: nullification spawned the ban on jury-control devices, which
now protect the power to nullify despite its illegal status. Next, this section
finds the Supreme Court’s justification for leaving the power to nullify in
place does not escape this logic, as nullification is the only reason for the
ban on jury-control devices.113
1.

Prohibition of Jury Control Devices: Tail Wagging the Dog?

Often, when courts state juries do not have the right to nullify, they
qualify the statement with an admission that juries have the power to do
so.114 This hand-wringing falls on deaf ears, though, when one considers
that juries have this power because judges allow them to have it. There are
many possible devices by which to control the jury, and yet the courts
refuse to implement them: directed verdicts for the State, judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, interrogatories with general verdicts, special
verdicts, ordering new trials based on inconsistent verdicts, judicial

111. Horowitz, supra note 106, at 450.
112. Horning, 254 U.S. at 138-39; Sparf, 156 U.S. at 106-07.
113. See Peter Westen, The Three Faces of Double Jeopardy: Reflections on Government
Appeals of Criminal Sentences, 78 MICH. L. REV. 1001, 1014-19 (1980).
114. See, e.g., Horning, 254 U.S. at 138.
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comments on the evidence, issue preclusion, and appeals or new trial based
on legal errors affecting the verdict.115 The Supreme Court has always been
careful to keep these options off the table, even in moments where it is most
strongly condemning the act of nullification.116
As one might expect, some believe jury verdicts, at least insofar as they
are inconsistent, are not reviewed so as to allow juries to nullify.117 If so,
then the tail has apparently come to wag the dog. But, is it possible these
anti-jury control devices serve another function besides insulating
nullifying juries from review? These mechanisms preserve the illegitimate
nullification power, but if they can, or must, stay in place for independent
reasons, nullification might then be a mere by-product to be tolerated in
service to these other goals.
For instance, we can question whether the inability to examine a
jury’s verdict after the fact – one of the most potent protections of
the power to nullify – serves a purpose besides allowing jurors to
nullify.118 [W]ith few exceptions . . . once the jury has heard the
evidence and the case has been submitted, the litigants must accept
the jury’s collective judgment. Courts have always resisted
inquiring into a jury’s thought processes . . . through this deference
the jury brings to the criminal process, in addition to the collective
judgment of the community, an element of needed finality.119
As seen previously in this Article, double jeopardy frequently steps into the
void as a justification for precluding the review of jury verdicts.120 When

115. Westen, supra note 113, at 1012-18.
116. See, e.g., Sparf, 156 U.S. at 105 (“In a civil case, the court may set aside the verdict,
whether it be for the plaintiff or defendant, upon the ground that it is contrary to the law as given
by the court; but in a criminal case, if the verdict is one of acquittal, the court has no power to set
it aside.”).
117. Akhil Reed Amar & Jonathan L. Marcus, Double Jeopardy Law After Rodney King, 95
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 49 (1995); see also Lissa Griffin, Untangling Double Jeopardy in MixedVerdict Cases, 63 SMU LAW REV. 1033, 1044 n.111 (2010) (“As other commentators have noted,
the only legitimate justification for this refusal to inquire into jury deliberations is the historic
prerogative of the jury to acquit against the evidence – that is, to nullify the law.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)); Andrew D. Leipold, Rethinking Jury Nullification, 82 VA. L. REV.
253, 258 (1996) (“[P]rocedural devices that are available in most trials to correct or prevent errors
– special verdicts, judgments as a matter of law, and appeals – are not available to the prosecution
in criminal cases. . . . [T]he unavailability of these procedures flows from a desire to protect the
nullification power from infringement.”); Westen & Drubel, supra note 3, at 129; Chaya
Weinberg-Brodt, Note, Jury Nullification and Jury-Control Procedures, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 825,
838 n.80 (1990) (collecting commentators).
118. Westen & Drubel, supra note 3, at 112-18.
119. United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 67 (1984).
120. Diane E. Courselle, Struggling with Deliberative Secrecy, Jury Independence, and Jury
Reform, 57 S.C. L. REV. 203, 212 n.37 (2005) (“The jury’s ability to acquit despite the law is
rooted in double jeopardy principles.” (citing Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10, 22 (1980))).
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the defendant is acquitted, there is no reason to review the jury because
nothing could come of it due to the Double Jeopardy Clause.121 This rule is
undisputed, with courts in virtually unanimous agreement.122 But, outside
of the inconsistent verdict context, and its concerns about windfall should
the defendant alone be allowed to challenge,123 why should stand-alone
verdicts that appear to result from merciful nullification be unreviewable?
Perhaps one could generalize the double jeopardy rationale from
inconsistent verdict cases to all cases as follows: if the state or government
can never review a jury’s decision-making in the event of an acquittal,
defendants should never be able to review a jury’s decision-making in the
event of a conviction.
Yet the lack of review of potential vindictive nullifications has not
been justified on double jeopardy grounds, and still there is no review.
Granted, convictions can be reviewed, but they are not reviewed for
possible nullification.
The only limit on this power [to vindictively nullify] is the due
process requirement that the jury base the conviction on legally
sufficient evidence . . . . [But] defendants have no protection
against a jury that chooses to convict on evidence it does not
actually believe meets the beyond a reasonable doubt standard, so
long as – given the benefit of every doubt – another reasonable
jury could have found sufficient proof.124
Even assuming double jeopardy considerations could be invoked to
insulate all verdicts from review for nullification so the entire appellate
playing field is level as between the parties, such considerations cannot
justify the prohibition of the other jury controls in criminal cases. Jurists
cite other considerations validating the lack of criminal jury controls,
though. “Many judges appear to view the jury’s power to nullify as an
unfortunate byproduct of the vigorous protection of other important
121. See, e.g., United States v. Kerley, 838 F.2d 932, 938 (7th Cir. 1988) (“[The jury] has the
power to acquit on bad grounds, because the government is not allowed to appeal from an
acquittal by a jury.”).
122. See, e.g., Nancy J. King, Silencing Nullification Advocacy Inside the Jury Room and
Outside the Courtroom, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 433, 446 n.59 (1998) (citing United States v.
DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 128-36 (1980)) (discussing how the Double Jeopardy Clause protects
the interest of the public and the defendant in the finality of judgments in criminal cases). For a
rare modern example of a court taking a pro-nullification position, only to be reversed on appeal,
see United States v. Polizzi, 549 F. Supp. 2d 308, 404, 449-50 (E.D.N.Y. 2008), vacated sub. nom.
United States v. Polouizzi, 564 F.3d 142 (2d Cir 2009).
123. I question the windfall argument. The Double Jeopardy Clause applies against the
State, and not the defendant. So why does the court feel the need to prevent the defendant from
appealing a possibly illegal conviction based upon a restriction against the State?
124. Courselle, supra note 120, at 212 n.37.
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constitutional values, not an end in itself.”125 For example, some judges
merely believe they are protecting the jury’s independent assessment of the
facts.126 Sparf itself relies on this rationale.127
Peter Westen, however, has already cogently dismissed this and other
possible justifications for the antipathy towards jury controls in our
jurisprudence, indicating:
Why prohibit the prosecution from using a device designed to
confine the criminal jury to the province of factfinding? It cannot
be based on a desire to let the jury find the facts, because directed
verdicts are used only where facts are not in dispute. Nor can it be
based upon the stringent burden of proof applicable in criminal
cases (and upon the consequent difficulty of saying that the state’s
evidence of guilt is so overwhelming that reasonable men would
have to convict), because that is precisely the assessment that trial
judges now make in finding criminal defendants guilty in trials to
the bench, and that appellate courts now make in declaring
constitutional errors to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.128
Nor can the prohibition on directed verdicts be based on a belief
that while the criminal jury has no legitimate right to nullify the
law, it somehow has an unpreventable power to do so. After all,
the very purpose of the directed verdict (and other jury-control
devices) is to prevent juries from exercising the power to decide
the law when they have no right to do so. If the legal system
wished to prevent the criminal jury from nullifying the law, it
125. King, supra note 122, at 437.
126. Id. at 446 n.58.
127. Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 106 (1895).
128. Westen, supra note 113, at 1116; see Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1999).
As discussed in more depth below, Neder and other cases have applied harmless error review in
such a way as to be fairly characterized as directing verdicts. Justice Scalia has repeatedly pointed
this out, arguing that harmless error review in erroneous jury instruction cases is unconstitutional
because it amounts to a directed verdict. Neder, 527 U.S. at 30-40. However, the majority of the
Court has signed off on harmless error review in such cases, though there remains tension in the
precedent on this point, as some earlier cases indicate that harmless error review should not
infringe on a jury’s fact-finding duties. Compare Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 578 (1986)
(“[H]armless-error analysis presumably would not apply if a court directed a verdict for the
prosecution in a criminal trial by jury. We have stated that ‘a trial judge is prohibited from
entering a judgment of conviction or directing the jury to come forward with such a
verdict . . . regardless of how overwhelmingly the evidence may point in that direction.’”) with
Neder, 527 U.S. at 17 n.2 (“Justice SCALIA, in his opinion concurring in part and dissenting in
part, also suggests that if a failure to charge on an uncontested element of the offense may be
harmless error, the next step will be to allow a directed verdict against a defendant in a criminal
case contrary to Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 578 (1986). Happily, our course of constitutional
adjudication has not been characterized by this ‘in for a penny, in for a pound’ approach. We
have no hesitation reaffirming Rose at the same time that we subject the narrow class of cases like
the present one to harmless-error review.”).
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would respond the way it does in civil cases – by directing verdicts
whenever the trial evidence contains no genuine issues of fact. To
say that a judge may not constitutionally direct a verdict against a
defendant in a criminal case means he or she may not
constitutionally confine the criminal jury to the role of factfinding.
The same is true, too, of other jury-control devices. By eschewing
the use of jury-control devices that would cabin the criminal jury
in a factfinding role, the system reveals that the jury’s prerogative
to acquit against the evidence is not only a “power,” but a power
the jury exercises as of “right.”129
“One could argue that the absence of these devices in criminal
procedure reflects the system’s unwillingness to limit the criminal trial jury
to the role of fact-finding.”130 Furthermore,
at some level, at least, nullification is implicit in the constitutional
notion of trial by jury, because nothing else explains why a
criminal defendant has a right to resist a directed verdict of
conviction, why he has a right to insist on a general verdict . . . and
why neither he nor the prosecutor has the right to challenge a
verdict for factual inconsistency.131
If these devices are based solely upon preserving nullification, as these
astute scholars agree, and nullification is illegal, as the Supreme Court says,
how can we stand to let these devices remain in place?
2.

The Supreme Court’s Rationale for Banning Jury Controls:
The Sixth Amendment Right to Jury in Criminal Trials

In Sparf, the Court found, over a vigorous dissent, the right to
nullification did not exist at the Founding.132 If this is the case, there would
appear to be no reason to bar jury control devices in criminal cases.133 Yet
we are immediately confronted with the fact that Sparf may have been

129. Westen, supra note 113, at 1016-17 (footnotes omitted); see, e.g., MO. SUP. CT. R.
72.01(a) (“A party may move for a directed verdict at the close of the evidence offered by an
opponent. . . . The order of the court granting a motion for a directed verdict is effective without
any assent of the jury.”).
130. Peter Arenella, Rethinking the Functions of Criminal Procedure: The Warren and
Burger Courts’ Competing Ideologies, 72 GEO. L.J. 185, 215 (1983).
131. Westen & Drubel, supra note 3, at 131-32 (footnotes omitted); see also Eric L. Muller,
The Hobgoblin of Little Minds? Our Foolish Law of Inconsistent Verdicts, 111 HARV. L. REV.
771, 827 (1998) (noting that special verdicts are disfavored because they would “foreclose the
possibility of jury leniency or drive the jurors to be more lenient than they wished”); WeinbergBrodt, supra note 117, at 838 n.80 (collecting commentators).
132. Sparf, 156 U.S. at 64-90; id. at 142-69 (Gray, J., dissenting).
133. See generally id.
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wrong about the Framers’ views, at least according to many scholars on the
issue.134 In some colonies, the criminal jury did have the right to nullify at
the Founding, even if that right is not exactly what modern proponents of
nullification mean by the term, and even if that right has since expired.135
Whether its history is right or wrong, the modern court views
nullification as illegitimate; therefore, the prohibition on these jury control
devices cannot legitimately come from a right to nullify. Instead, the
prohibition apparently stems directly from the right to a jury in a criminal
case.136 “The right [to trial by jury in criminal cases] includes, of course, as
its most important element, the right to have the jury, rather than the judge,
reach the requisite finding of ‘guilty.’”137 Interestingly, as noted above, the
Supreme Court’s protection of the power is seen even in Sparf, where the
Court noted directed verdicts and the review of acquittal verdicts are
anathema.138 Many observers thus believe criminal courts recoil from
directed verdicts because they would preclude even the possibility of
nullification.139
Yet, upon further examination, this appeal to the Sixth Amendment140
is nothing more than an appeal to the right to nullification, just as all
prohibitions on jury control measures boil down to protecting
nullification.141 Whenever someone contends “a court may not enter a
directed verdict of guilty even if the court is convinced that a rational juror
could not vote for acquittal in light of the evidence presented . . . [b]ecause
the Sixth Amendment gives criminal defendants a right to trial by jury,”142
the question arises as to why one cannot say the same thing about civil
defendants and the Seventh Amendment.
After all, the Seventh
Amendment similarly provides for a jury: “[i]n Suits at common
law . . . the right of trial by jury shall be preserved.”143 This guarantee to a
jury trial does not appear materially different from that contained in the
134. See, e.g., Donald M. Middlebrooks, Reviving Thomas Jefferson’s Jury: Sparf and
Hansen v. United States Reconsidered, 46 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 353, 354 (2004).
135. Brody, supra note 79, at 95.
136. See generally Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 277 (1993) (citing Sparf v. United
States, 156 U.S. 51, 105-06 (1895)).
137. Id.
138. Sparf, 156 U.S. at 105-06, 294-95.
139. Sherman J. Clark, The Courage of Our Convictions, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2381, 2436
n.119 (1999); D. Michael Risinger, John Henry Wigmore, Johnny Lynn Old Chief, and
“Legitimate Moral Force” - Keeping the Courtroom Safe for Heartstrings and Gore, 49
HASTINGS L.J. 403, 407 n.14 (1998); Leipold, supra note 117, 298 n.172.
140. Article III also provides for juries for “The Trial of all Crimes.” U.S. CONST. art. III., §
2, cl. 3.
141. Leipold, supra note 117, at 266-67.
142. Pettys, supra note 35, at 498-99.
143. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
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Sixth Amendment, providing: “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to . . . a trial, by an impartial jury.”144
Currently, in civil cases, the jury’s law declaring power is merely
historic.145 Similarly, the government can appeal in civil cases under the
Seventh Amendment.146 The fact the constitutional right to civil juries does
not preclude directed verdicts or governmental appeals, illustrates that
nullification drives the criminal jury’s resistance to judicial control.147 “It is
of course true that verdicts induced by passion and prejudice are not
unknown in civil suits. But in civil cases, post-trial motions and appellate
review provide an aggrieved litigant a remedy; in a criminal case the
government has no similar avenue to correct errors.”148 Crucially, while
there is disagreement as to whether either criminal or civil juries had
nullification rights at the Founding, the general consensus now appears that
both the Sixth and Seventh Amendment juries were put in place to preserve
nullification, at least to some extent.149 Apparently, nullification was
important in the civil context to protect debtors from creditors,150 a concern
animating other parts of the Constitution as well.151 Thus, the right to
nullification of some sort, inherent in the Seventh Amendment, has
apparently been eliminated by the Supreme Court, raising the question as to
whether the Supreme Court could do the same with the Sixth
Amendment.152 Merely citing to the word “jury” in the Constitution, by
itself, then, cannot explain the resistance to jury controls. In other words,
the text of the Constitution does not appear to mandate nullification or the

144. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
145. Burt Neuborne, Serving the Syllogism Machine: Reflections on Whether Brandenburg
is Now (or Ever Was) Good Law, 44 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1, 44 n.289 (2011).
146. King, supra note 122, at 447 n.61.
147. Leipold, supra note 117, at 267.
148. Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10, 23 (1980).
149. See, e.g., Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 1, 3 (1794); Jonathan Bressler,
Reconstruction and the Transformation of Jury Nullification, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 1133, 1155
(2011) (“[T]he constitutional right to criminal jury trial implicitly protected the jury’s right to
nullify.”); King, supra note 122, at 437 (“[M]uch of the commentary on jury nullification assumes
that the Constitution affirmatively protects the jury’s power, describing that power as a personal
constitutional right of every juror in a criminal case, as a right guaranteed to the defendant by the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments, or as one of the checks and balances on other institutions of federal
government provided by Article III.”). But see Noah, supra note 17, at 1627-28 (“The
inconveniences of jury trial were accepted precisely because in important instances, through its
ability to disregard substantive rules of law, the [civil] jury would reach a result that the judge
either could not or would not reach.” (citing Charles W. Wolfram, The Constitutional History of
the Seventh Amendment, 57 MINN. L. REV. 639, 671 (1973))).
150. Wolfram, supra note 149, at 673-705.
151. See generally U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
152. See generally id.
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prohibition on criminal jury controls, at least insofar as the treatment of
criminal and civil jury controls has diverged.
Moreover, the Supreme Court itself has indicated any criminal jury
nullification right that existed at the Founding – whatever its exact form –
can be rolled back. The conception of the constitutional jury is not frozen
as of the time of the Founding. The courts have repeatedly held the Seventh
Amendment right to a jury in civil trials does not mean the right to a
prohibition against directed verdicts.153 In Galloway v. United States,154 the
Court rejected the appellant’s contention that the Seventh Amendment
barred directed verdicts.155 “If the intention is to claim generally that
the . . . [Seventh] Amendment deprives the federal courts of power to direct
a verdict for insufficiency of evidence, the short answer is the contention
has been foreclosed by repeated decisions made here consistently for nearly
a century.”156 The longer answer was:
The Amendment did not bind the federal courts to the exact
procedural incidents or details of jury trial according to the
common law in 1791 . . . . [T]he Amendment was designed to
preserve the basic institution of jury trial only in its most
fundamental elements, not the great mass of procedural forms and
details, varying even then so widely among common-law
jurisdictions.157
In Gasperini v. Center for Humanities,158 the Court explicitly
acknowledged the Seventh Amendment jury had changed over time, and yet
the basic guarantee of a civil jury could still be, and was being, honored.159
The changes to the civil jury include: six-member panels instead of twelve;
new trials restricted to the determination of damages; motions for judgment
as a matter of law; the use of issue preclusion absent the mutuality of
parties; and, in Gasperini itself, appellate review of trial court’s refusal to
vacate a jury’s award as against the weight of the evidence.160 Thus, the
treatment of the Seventh Amendment indicates any historical understanding
of the right to nullify is not necessarily dispositive under the Sixth
Amendment either.

153. Jeffrey O. Cooper, Searching for Harmlessness: Method and Madness in the Supreme
Court’s Harmless Constitutional Error Doctrine, 50 U. KAN. L. REV. 309, 335-36 (2002).
154. 319 U.S. 372 (1943).
155. Galloway, 319 U.S. at 389.
156. Id. (citations omitted).
157. Id. at 390-92.
158. 518 U.S. 415 (1996).
159. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 436 n.20.
160. Id.
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Still, the Supreme Court line of cases allowing for directed verdicts in
civil cases was careful not to imply that directed verdicts were allowed in
criminal cases. In Hepner v. United States,161 the Court granted that
directed verdicts are allowed under the Constitution, but “restrict[ed] [its]
decision to civil cases.”162 The Sixth Amendment jury, however, is viewed
differently:
The constitutional right to a jury trial embodies ‘a profound
judgment about the way in which law should be enforced and
justice administered. . . .’
It is a structural guarantee that
‘reflect[s] a fundamental decision about the exercise of official
power – a reluctance to entrust plenary powers over the life and
liberty of the citizen to one judge or to a group of judges. . . .’ A
defendant may assuredly insist upon observance of this guarantee
even when the evidence against him is so overwhelming as to
establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. That is why the Court
has found it constitutionally impermissible for a judge to direct a
verdict for the State.163
These repeated distinctions between the criminal and civil juries simply
do not hold up under scrutiny. Perhaps one could argue the nullification
embedded in the Seventh Amendment was never as powerful a right as its
sister nullification innate in the Sixth Amendment. Along this line, Roger
Kirst has argued the civil jury’s nullification power at the Founding was
already curtailed by several devices, including some that took the facts
away from the jury, some that reviewed the jury’s actions, and some that
merely guided the jury.164 According to Kirst, even new trial grants and
directed verdicts were used in colonial days.165 Still, Kirst also noted the
Seventh Amendment jury was meant, in part, to placate the anti-Federalists
who sought to have the jury determine the facts and the law.166 “The
nullification roots of the [S]eventh [A]mendment need not be totally
ignored.”167 Thus, even if the Sixth Amendment has a stronger claim to
nullification, the Supreme Court’s complete disavowal of the Seventh

161. 213 U.S. 103 (1909).
162. Hepner, 213 U.S. at 115.
163. Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263, 268 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Duncan
v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155-56 (1968)).
164. Roger W. Kirst, The Jury’s Historic Domain in Complex Cases, 58 WASH. L. REV. 1,
15 (1982).
165. Id. at 17.
166. Id. at 18.
167. Id. at 20.

436

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 88:409

Amendment’s nullification roots paves the way to do the same to the Sixth
Amendment.168
VI. THE POSSIBLE FUTURE OF NULLIFICATION DOCTRINES
When laid bare, this contradiction lying at the heart of the nullification
doctrine should be discomfiting for all jurists. Even as the judiciary
denounces nullification in form, the judiciary protects nullification in
substance. In this section, three possible routes the doctrine can take are
explored, followed by a prediction of what the Supreme Court will actually
do with the doctrine in the future.
A. FIXING THE COGNITIVE DISSONANCE
At this point, it leaves one questioning as to why the courts, on several
occasions since Sparf, insist on reminding us that juries have the power to
nullify.169 In Standefer v. United States,170 the Court conceded “[t]he
absence of these [jury control] procedures in criminal cases permits juries to
acquit out of compassion or compromise or because of ‘their assumption of
a power which they had no right to exercise, but to which they were
disposed through lenity.’”171 And, as mentioned previously, in Gregg, a
plurality of the Court stated it would be unconstitutional to use jury control
devices to preclude juries from nullifying.172 The ultimate question is: what
are we to do about this cognitive dissonance in which nullification is illegal
but protected at the same time? There are three apparent paths to choose
from. The first, most seen in academia, is to return to the Framers’ intent
and recognize the right to nullify.173 The second path is the one currently
chosen by the judiciary, which is to live with the incongruity, and the third
path is to fully accept that nullification is illegal and accept the
consequences.
1.

Recognizing the Right to Nullify

Perhaps Justices Scalia and Thomas would overrule Sparf based on its
ahistorical reasoning, at least if the Founding Era is used as the reference

168. See generally id.
169. See generally Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51 (1895).
170. 447 U.S. 10 (1980).
171. Standefer, 447 U.S. at 25 (quoting Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 393 (1932)).
172. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 199 (1976); see Westen, supra note 113, 1016 n.56.
173. See, e.g., Tom Stacy & Kim Dayton, Rethinking Harmless Constitutional Error, 88
COLUM. L. REV. 79, 140 (1988).
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point.174 Justice Scalia’s statements in Carella v. California175 comes as
close as one will see, post-Sparf, to acknowledging that nullification is at
the heart of the existence of the criminal jury, as his “circuit breaker”
appears a metaphor for the act of nullification.176 However, this seems
unlikely to happen, as courts have, for decades, repeatedly and uniformly,
rejected the right to nullify for decades at this point.
The predicted outcome of this situation can be interpreted by viewing a
court’s reaction to other issues, such as Confrontation Clause issues. For
example, many years of precedent indicated that whether a statement passed
the bar against hearsay would determine whether the statement would pass
constitutional muster under the Confrontation Clause, as demonstrated by
the leading case of Ohio v. Roberts.177 Yet, with Justice Scalia writing, the
Supreme Court decoupled the Confrontation Clause from hearsay
jurisprudence in Crawford v. Washington,178 thereby overruling Roberts.179
Animating the decision was a desire to return the clause to its original
understanding according to the Framers.180 Thus, it is conceivable a court
could treat Sparf as it did Roberts, overruling it as a departure from the
Framers’ understanding of the right at issue. If a right to a criminal jury
meant a right to a jury with nullification power, then that would be the end
of the matter, at least for an orthodox originalist.
2.

Living with the Cognitive Dissonance

However, the United States Supreme Court will likely continue with
the status quo. As one commentator indicated, “[w]hen faced with the
obvious illogic of legally protecting a power whose exercise has been
declared ‘wrongful’ by the Supreme Court, judges explicitly have chosen to

174. In an intriguing recent article, Jonathan Bressler argues that an originalism-based
perspective of the right vel non to nullify need not take the Founding Era as the definitive time
period; instead, the Reconstruction Era provides another important time period in the
constitutional treatment of nullification, and perhaps a more relevant period at that. See generally
Bressler, supra note 149. Working from a Reconstruction Era basis in which the Fourteenth
Amendment reshaped the meaning of prior amendments, including the Sixth Amendment,
nullification may well be illegal on both a state and federal level, though other interpretations are
possible as well. Id. at 1199-1201.
175. 491 U.S. 263 (1989).
176. Carella, 491 U.S. at 268 (Scalia, J., concurring).
177. 448 U.S. 56, 62 (1980).
178. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
179. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 36.
180. Id. at 59 (“Our cases have thus remained faithful to the Framers’ understanding:
[t]estimonial statements of witnesses absent from trial have been admitted only where the
declarant is unavailable, and only where the defendant has had a prior opportunity to crossexamine.”).

438

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 88:409

discard logic rather than the model.”181 Nullification is wrong, but if it still
exists despite our admonitions to the contrary, we will do nothing further
about it. We have already seen that textualists would have a problem
arguing for nullification based on the Sixth Amendment, given use of the
identical term “jury” in the Seventh Amendment, and yet, consensus that
civil juries have no nullification right or power.
Interestingly, originalists182 too would have an issue in attempting to
reinvigorate the jury with the right to nullify. Even originalists, when
seeking to take the Constitution back to its roots, have found it necessary to
make concessions to changes in the law that have accrued since the
Founding, even though they may not admit doing so. “[O]riginalism is a
fundamentally flawed approach to constitutional interpretation in criminal
procedure issues because originalists fail to grasp – or to admit – the degree
to which legal doctrine and legal institutions have changed since the
Framing.”183 Thomas Davies has argued even Crawford, which many think
of as a landmark in Justice Scalia’s long crusade to return the Constitution
to its original meaning or intent, compromises the Founders’ view of the
constitutional right at issue because of changes in the law over the
centuries.184 According to Davies, “[c]ontrary to Crawford’s claims, the
confrontation right was not limited to ‘testimonial hearsay’ at the time of
the framing, and framing-era sources did not draw any distinction between
testimonial and nontestimonial hearsay.”185 Therefore, despite whatever the
originalists may argue about the purity of their endeavor, even
“[o]riginalism is dependent upon the historical fiction that the content of
constitutional rights can somehow have remained constant when the law
that shaped and informed the content of those rights plainly has not.”186
In other words, even for originalists, there is no returning to the time of
the Founding, not with all the water that has since passed under the bridge
of time. The Court did not repeal all of the hearsay exceptions that judges

181. Weinberg-Brodt, supra note 117, at 838 n.80. The result is that criminal juries should
be controlled just like civil juries. Retrials may not be allowed in the event of a nullifying
acquittal because of Double Jeopardy, and the Court’s fairness rationale in Dougherty might
prevent retrial of nullifying convictions as well, but what about allowing directed verdicts and
special verdicts?
182. See, e.g., Bret Boyce, Originalism and the Fourteenth Amendment, 33 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 909, 915 (2009). Originalism seeks to interpret laws according to the meaning of the laws at
the time of their enactment. Id.
183. Thomas Y. Davies, Not “The Framers’ Design”: How the Framing-Era Ban Against
Hearsay Evidence Refutes the Crawford-Davis “Testimonial” Formulation of the Scope of the
Original Confrontation Clause, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 349, 354-55 (2007).
184. Id. at 465.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 466.
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have invented since the Framing; instead, the Court protected many of them
by calling the evidence “non-testimonial,” a category the Framers did not
recognize.187 Similarly, it seems we are not going to undo over a century of
precedent and suddenly recognize the right of juries to nullify; instead, we
are likely to live with it while ignoring it.188 Justice Jackson put this
sentiment as follows in a related context:
We concur in the general opinion of courts, textwriters and the
profession that much of this law is archaic, paradoxical and full of
compromises and compensations by which an irrational advantage
to one side is offset by a poorly reasoned counter-privilege to the
other. But somehow it has proved a workable even if clumsy
system when moderated by discretionary controls in the hands of a
wise and strong trial court. To pull one misshapen stone out of the
grotesque structure is more likely simply to upset its present
balance between adverse interests than to establish a rational
edifice.189
As it is with the law of evidence, so it is with nullification, with the
current regime being “paradoxical and full of compromises and
compensations,” but “somehow . . . [it] has proved a workable even if
clumsy system.”190 The best Justice Scalia and other originalists can
probably hope for regarding the right to nullify is an uneasy compromise,
such as was forged in Crawford. In general, compromise on the issue of
nullification was reached years ago, and will continue to be an uneasy truce
for the foreseeable future unless one of the other two drastic paths is taken.
3.

Recognizing the Ban on Criminal Jury Controls
as Anachronistic

Although the path of compromise is the one most likely to be traveled
by the Supreme Court for the foreseeable future, the path compelled by the
logic of current precedent is to allow jury control devices in criminal cases.
This path will strike almost every judge, many scholars, and many regular
citizens as anathema. The right to be judged by one’s peers is surely near
187. Id. at 467-68.
188. The tempering of pure originalism by longstanding tradition, including stare decisis, has
been seen in the work of Justice Scalia, though the other originalist justice on the Supreme Court,
Justice Thomas, refuses to compromise his originalism in this way. See Brannon P. Denning,
Common Law Constitutional Interpretation: A Critique, 27 CONST. COMM. 621, 641 (2011)
(reviewing DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION (2010)); Bradley W. Joondeph,
Beyond the Doctrine: Five Questions That Will Determine the ACA’s Constitutional Fate, 46
UNIV. RICH. L. REV. 763, 770 n.26. (2012).
189. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 486 (1948).
190. Id.
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and dear to many Americans, so much so that it would be difficult to
conceive of allowing directed verdicts in criminal cases. But, is it much
harder to conceive of courts openly acknowledging that juries have a right
to nullify? Perhaps, if courts were put to the choice between controlling the
jury and openly allowing nullification, more courts would be willing to
acknowledge the right to nullify before they would be willing to direct a
verdict in a criminal case. If so, as this author believes to be true, then this
third path is the most unlikely.
Nonetheless, paths one and three are the only ones that sincerely and
openly deal with the irrational and intellectually dishonest compromise
currently reigning in nullification jurisprudence. Furthermore, path three is
the only of those two that comports with the Supreme Court’s definitive
statement that nullification is illegal.191 The rest of the Court’s precedents
on jury controls do not gainsay Sparf’s reasoning, but instead perpetuate an
illegal practice.192 Whatever one thinks of the competing historical
narratives of nullification, and the courts’ treatment of nullification for civil
and criminal juries, several tenets are evident. Nullification is illegal, and
the absence of jury control devices serves solely to perpetuate this
practice.193
The nature of the jury has changed over time, and this incontrovertible
fact may be reason enough for courts to reevaluate what the right to a
criminal jury means in present times. The evolution of the right to testify is
a corresponding example of a sea change in the understanding of a legal
issue from the Founding to present, and a change resulting in a new reading
of the Constitution.194 At early common law, which presumably impacted
the thinking of the Framers, interested witnesses were not competent to
testify at criminal trials.195 This included even criminal defendants.196 Yet,
in Rock v. Arkansas,197 the Court recognized a criminal defendant has a
constitutional right to testify.198 As such, the Court had found a right the
Founders could not have even imagined.199
Granted, finding a
191. See Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 102 (1895).
192. See generally Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 277 (1993) (holding that directed
guilty verdicts are not allowed in a criminal trial).
193. Westen, supra note 113, at 1015-18.
194. Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 49 (1987).
195. Joseph A. Colquitt & Charles W. Gamble, From Incompetency to Weight and
Credibility: The Next Step in an Historic Trend, 47 ALA. L. REV. 145, 147-48 (1995).
196. Id. at 148.
197. 483 U.S. 44 (1987).
198. Rock, 483 U.S. at 49.
199. The Rock Court found the constitutional right to testify in three amendments: the Fifth,
Sixth, and Fourteenth. Id. at 51-53. One could argue that the Fourteenth Amendment imported
mid-nineteenth century jurisprudence into the calculus, and by this time, courts had perhaps begun
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constitutional right the Founders would have disavowed is not necessarily
equivalent to not finding a right that the Founders would have affirmed. In
the former case one could at least argue that the Founders had not explicitly
spoken on the issue, leaving some room for implication, whereas in the
latter case, one would have to disagree with the Founder’s interpretation of
words positively enacted into the Constitution. Still, Rock demonstrates the
Court’s willingness to interpret constitutional rights in light of the last twoplus centuries of change to the legal background against which those rights
were enacted.200 As noted above, such a development seems to have
already occurred with the Seventh Amendment jury.201 If the Supreme
Court has changed what the civil jury means,202 why not the criminal jury?
Therefore, it is conceivable the Court, over the objections of its
originalist members would hold that the right to nullification, if it existed in
the Constitution at the Founding, no longer exists. Accordingly, they would
continue to argue that the criminal jury’s safeguards no longer serve a
legitimate purpose. There would be other difficulties in sweeping away the
jury control devices. For instance, the Double Jeopardy Clause would still
loom large for attempts to control the jury after verdict, like new trial and
judgments notwithstanding, but these concerns can at least theoretically be
addressed.203 Also, while directed verdicts are currently completely
banned, special verdicts are not completely banned as directed verdicts are:
sentencing determinations hinging on a particular fact, and in treason cases,
special verdicts are actually allowed.204

allowing criminal defendants to testify in their own case. However, insofar as the Court relies on
the original Bill of Rights, the Court is taking a starkly non-originalist position. Id. at 49 (“At this
point in the development of our adversary system, it cannot be doubted that a defendant in a
criminal case has the right to take the witness stand and to testify in his or her own defense. This,
of course, is a change from the historic common-law view, which was that all parties to litigation,
including criminal defendants, were disqualified from testifying because of their interest in the
outcome of the trial.”).
200. Rock, 483 U.S. at 49 (“At this point in the development of our adversary system, it
cannot be doubted that a defendant in a criminal case has the right to take the witness stand and to
testify in his or her own defense.” (emphasis added)).
201. See supra Part V.B.2.
202. Noah, supra note 17, at 1629.
203. If the courts were to determine that jeopardy does not attach until after the judge loses
jurisdiction over the case, rather than when the jury is sworn in, then perhaps these jury-control
devices could survive the Double Jeopardy Clause.
204. Barkow, supra note 47, at 50 n.67 (citing United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165, 182
n.66 (1st Cir. 1969)).
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B. WHAT WOULD THE SUPREME COURT LIKELY SAY UPON
REVISITING THE ISSUE?
So far in this Article, the discussion about the right vel non to nullify
has taken for granted that nullification is illegal, and has faced the
consequences of the baseline result from Sparf.205 Given that opponents of
nullification may be satisfied with the right being openly rejected, and that
proponents of nullification can be comforted with the knowledge that the
power is still exercised because of lack of jury controls in criminal trials,
neither side may wish to upset the balance that has been struck over time.
But should the Supreme Court decide to revisit Sparf, what would be the
likely result?
Because of concerns over diminution of the role of the jury, it is
plausible the Supreme Court may revisit a jury’s power or right to
nullify.206 Recently, the Court began developing this jurisprudence in Jones
v. United States,207 in which the Court addressed a jury’s diminished
significance since the Sixth Amendment’s enactment.208 The Court
considered whether certain facts must be found by a jury instead of the
judge, and found the facts at issue were elements, rather than mere
enhancements of the crime, and thus must be put before the jury.209
[U]nder the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the
notice and jury trial guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, any fact
(other than a prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty
for a crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury,
and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.210
Jones only discusses the fact-finding function of the jury, which by
definition does not approach the nullifying function of the jury.211 Still, the
varying degrees of defensiveness shown on behalf of the jury might be
telling in the nullification context. As often happens in the criminal
context, the stereotypical liberal-conservative lines are blurred,212
considering the opinion was written by Justice Souter, and joined by

205. See generally Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51 (1895).
206. Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 248 (1999).
207. 526 U.S. 227 (1999).
208. Jones, 526 U.S. at 248.
209. Id. at 229.
210. Id. at 243 n.6.
211. Id. at 244.
212. Rachel E. Barkow, Originalists, Politics, and Criminal Law on the Rehnquist Court, 74
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1043, 1071 (2006) (“[T]he conservative Justices cannot be neatly arrayed
according to the attitudinal models when it comes to criminal matters.”).
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Justices Stevens, Scalia, Thomas, and Ginsburg.213 Of those three still on
the Court, there are other data points suggesting they all might support a
right to nullification to some degree.
1.

Justice Scalia

Justice Scalia’s support for a strong jury is particularly salient on the
Court.214 He has stated the jury right is “the spinal column of American
democracy.”215 In addition to Carella,216 Justice Scalia has also sought to
protect the jury in other harmless error cases. In both California v. Roy217
and Neder v. United States,218 Justice Scalia wrote separately from the
majority to state his position that the failure to instruct a jury on an element
of a crime cannot be considered harmless error.219 In Roy, Justice Scalia
was merely speaking to an issue not before the Court on that occasion,
drawing a line in the sand for a future case.220 But in Neder, the issue of
erroneous jury instructions was squarely presented, giving Justice Scalia a
fuller opportunity to discuss his view of the role of the jury in our
system.221 According to Justice Scalia, allowing appellate judges to
conduct harmless error review in cases where the jury did not have the
opportunity to render a verdict based on a proper recitation of the law is
tantamount to a directed verdict.222 And as Justice Scalia noted, the
majority hardly disputes this comparison, instead sidestepping the charge
on the ground that “our course of constitutional adjudication has not been
characterized by this ‘in for a penny, in for a pound’ approach,” which
apparently means that taking one element away from the jury is, at most, a
partial directed verdict, and thus tolerable to the Court.223
Furthermore, in his solo concurrence in Apprendi v. New Jersey224 and
in the majority opinion in Blakely v. Washington,225 Justice Scalia ardently
213. Jones, 526 U.S. at 229.
214. Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Harmless Constitutional Error and the Institutional Significance
of the Jury, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2027, 2047 (2008) (“Justice Antonin Scalia . . . has been the
leading voice on the Court in favor of the jury trial right . . . .”).
215. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 30 (1999).
216. Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263, 267 (1989) (Scalia, J. concurring).
217. 519 U.S. 2 (1996).
218. 527 U.S. 1 (1999).
219. Neder, 527 U.S. at 33 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Roy, 519
U.S. at 7 (Scalia, J., concurring).
220. Roy, 519 U.S. at 6 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“I do not understand the opinion, however, to
address the question of what constitutes the harmlessness to which this more deferential standard
is applied.” (emphasis in original)).
221. Neder, 527 U.S. at 30 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
222. Id. at 33.
223. Id. at 17 n.2 (majority opinion).
224. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
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defended the jury from what he perceives as the statist encroachment of
experts; in other words, he continues to defend the turf of law against the
advances of equity.226 It was in Blakely he somewhat famously referred to
the jury as the “circuit-breaker” in the machinery of the criminal justice
system.227 Further tracing this line of precedent, he joined the majority in
United States v. Booker,228 holding the Sixth Amendment jury trial right
applies to the Sentencing Guidelines, but did not join the other majority in
making the Guidelines advisory.229 He would have held the Guidelines
were properly mandatory, with the caveat being the jury should be used in
cases where a fact is “legally essential to the sentence imposed.”230 Justice
Scalia’s dissent in Gasperini, provides another piece of evidence, arguing
federal courts should not review refusals by district courts to set aside civil
jury awards as contrary to the weight of the evidence in an attempt to
protect civil juries from meddling.231
Justice Scalia’s insistence on the right to a jury, especially in the
harmless error cases when the evidence is overwhelming as to guilt, implies
Justice Scalia believes in the right of the jury to nullify. Such a belief
would not be surprising, as Justice Scalia generally supports an
understanding of constitutional rights that aligns with the understanding of
the Framers.232 Then again, holding a firm line against directed verdicts in
any form, whether directing the entire verdict or just one element, can be
distinguished from recognizing the right to nullify – after all, the party line
of the Court is that directed verdicts are illegal, but so is nullification. Still,
if these skirmishes over the jury would erupt into an open confrontation
over nullification, many would probably expect Justice Scalia to defend that
right based on an originalist understanding, though the long-standing nature
225. 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
226. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 498-99 (Scalia, J. concurring) (“The founders of the American
Republic were not prepared to leave it to the State, which is why the jury-trial guarantee was one
of the least controversial provisions of the Bill of Rights. It has never been efficient; but it has
always been free.”); Blakely, 542 U.S. at 313 (“Our Constitution and the common-law traditions it
entrenches, however, do not admit the contention that facts are better discovered by judicial
inquisition than by adversarial testing before a jury.”).
227. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 306.
228. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
229. Booker, 543 U.S. at 225.
230. Id. at 303-04 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Inexplicably, however, the opinion concludes that
the manner of achieving uniform sentences was more important to Congress than actually
achieving uniformity – that Congress was so attached to having judges determine ‘real conduct’
on the basis of bureaucratically prepared, hearsay-riddled presentence reports that it would rather
lose the binding nature of the Guidelines than adhere to the old-fashioned process of having juries
find the facts that expose a defendant to increased prison time.” (emphasis in original)).
231. See generally Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415 (1996).
232. Stephanos Bibas, Originalism and Formalism in Criminal Procedure: The Triumph of
Justice Scalia, the Unlikely Friend of Criminal Defendants?, 94 GEO. L.J. 183, 187 (2005).

2012]

JURY NULLIFICATION

445

of Sparf, clocking in now at over a century, may dissuade even Justice
Scalia from razing such precedent.233 The larger question becomes, if
Justice Scalia places originalism over stare decisis in this situation, would
anyone else make the leap with him?
2.

Justice Thomas

Justice Thomas is, if anything, a more orthodox practitioner of
originalism than Justice Scalia.234 Yet when it involves the right to a jury in
a criminal trial, Justice Thomas has not joined in Justice Scalia’s opinions
in either Roy235 or Neder,236 putting him in the unusual position of being
alongside the Court’s pragmatists.237 In another context, however, Justice
Thomas seemed more sympathetic to nullification, to which we now turn.
In Penry v. Johnson,238 Justice Thomas, along with Justice Scalia and
Chief Justice Rehnquist, appear to approve of a so-called “nullifying
instruction.”239 The issue in that case, often termed Penry II, was whether
the trial court had adequately instructed the jury regarding its ability to
consider mitigating evidence.240 In finding the trial court had done its duty,
Justice Thomas noted the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals had concluded
the trial court had given adequate instructions because it had given a
“nullification instruction.”241 Thus, Justice Thomas, by adopting this
characterization of the instruction and finding the instruction adequate,
approved, in a limited fashion, of nullification.242 Still, as noted in Part II,
the death penalty sentencing area may be considered unique when it comes
to nullification, as the justification for considering non-legal mitigating
factors and dispensing mercy, and not only justice, is at its greatest.243
233. See Karl S. Coplan, Legal Realism, Innate Morality, and the Structural Role of the
Supreme Court in the U.S. Constitutional Democracy, 86 TUL. L. REV. 181, 213 n.89 (“Justice
Scalia has described himself as a ‘faint hearted originalist’ who would allow originalist principles
to yield to stare decisis.”).
234. Lawrence Rosenthal, Originalism in Practice, 87 IND. L.J. 1183, 1203 (2012) (“Justice
Thomas may more often be faithful to original expected applications than Justice Scalia.”).
235. California v. Roy, 519 U.S. 2, 3, 5 (1996) (noting that that majority opinion is per
curiam and that only Justice Ginsburg joined in Justice Scalia’s separate opinion).
236. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 3 (1999) (noting that Justice Thomas joined in the
majority opinion, not Justice Scalia’s separate opinion).
237. Barkow, supra note 212, at 1068.
238. 532 U.S. 782 (2001).
239. Penry, 532 U.S. at 806 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
240. Id. at 786 (majority opinion).
241. Id. at 806 n.2 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
242. See generally id.
243. Barkow, supra note 212, at 1065 (“[T]he Court itself has recognized that ‘death is
different.’”) (citing Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272 (1980)); Woodson v. North Carolina,
428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (plurality opinion) (“[T]he penalty of death is qualitatively different
from a sentence of imprisonment, however long.”)).
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Intriguingly, Justice Thomas has joined Justice Scalia in criticizing their
colleagues for treating criminal procedure different in the death penalty
context.244
Further evidence of Justice Thomas’ sympathies with nullification is
found in his signing onto Justice Scalia’s opinions. This occurred in
Gasperini, which granted judges more power at the expense of juries, and
in Apprendi and Blakely, holding that a jury must find any fact that allows
for imposition of an exceptional sentence, i.e., one beyond the standard
maximum.245 Justices Thomas and Scalia voted together in Booker as
well.246
In the end, Justice Thomas’ voting record is ambivalent. He has shown
a tendency to protect the jury in the Apprendi line of cases, disputing the
roles of the jury and the judge, but did not do so in the harmless error
cases.247 Because the exercise of harmless error approximates the use of a
directed verdict, those cases seem particularly instructive, meaning that
Justice Thomas, given his austere judicial philosophy, is not as strong an
ally of the pro-nullification camp as one may first expect.
3.

Justice Ginsburg

We turn next to Justice Ginsburg, the other still-active member of the
Court from Jones to join Justice Scalia. Joining Justice Scalia in Roy and
Neder as well, Justice Ginsburg indicates she might favor the right of a jury
to acquit in the face of overwhelming evidence, i.e., nullify.248 She also
joined Justices Scalia and Thomas in Blakely,249 and in the Booker majority
holding that the Sentencing Guidelines are only advisory, though she did
not vote with them on the other issue, as she helped uphold the rest of the
Guidelines.250 Most recently, in Cunningham v. California,251 she authored
the majority opinion, holding California’s system of allowing “the judge,
not the jury, to find the facts permitting an upper term sentence” violated

244. See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 337 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (referring
to the Court’s “death-is-different jurisprudence”).
245. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 300-01 (2003); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530
U.S. 466, 499 (2000); Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 448 (1996) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
246. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 225 (2005).
247. See, e.g., Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 11 (1999).
248. Id. at 30 (Scalia, J., dissenting); California v. Roy, 519 U.S. 2, 6 (1996) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
249. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 297.
250. Booker, 543 U.S. at 244.
251. 549 U.S. 270 (2007).
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the Sixth Amendment.252 As expected, she was joined by Justices Scalia
and Thomas.253
However, she did not join Justices Thomas and Scalia in Penry.254
That said, the majority opinion did not truly confront the issue of
nullification, and it would be a stretch to say Justice Ginsubrg and the
others joining Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion believed that they were
stating a view on nullification.255 Furthermore, she did not protect the civil
jury in Gasperini with Justices Scalia and Thomas, which is no surprise,
given that her constitutional theory is not as dependent on original meaning
or intent.256 Still, her treatment of the Seventh Amendment may not fairly
predict her handling of the Sixth Amendment, as the Supreme Court has
long distinguished the two types of juries, rightly or wrongly.257 In sum,
given her solidarity with Justice Scalia in the harmless error cases, Justice
Ginsburg is perhaps even more likely than Justice Thomas to join with
Justice Scalia in recognizing the right to nullify.
4.

Justices Breyer and Kennedy

Justices Breyer and Kennedy’s voting pattern indicates they are less
likely than either Justice Thomas or Justice Ginsburg, and much less likely
than Justice Scalia, to favor the right to nullify. They voted against Scalia
in Roy, Neder, and Gasperini.258 However, Justice Kennedy, unlike
Justices Breyer and Thomas, was around to cast his vote with the majority
opinion in Carella, rather than throw his lot in with the concurring opinion
of Justice Scalia.259 Moreover, they both voted against Justices Scalia and
Thomas in Jones,260 (and Penry II for that matter),261 arguably showing less

252. Cunningham, 549 U.S. at 293.
253. Id. at 273.
254. Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 785 (2001).
255. The majority found the instructions inadequate largely because the instructions were
incompatible, such that the “nullifying instruction” was directly at odds with other instructions
and the jurors might find it impossible to follow the nullifying instruction, rendering the issue of
whether the nullifying instruction was appropriate or effective moot. Id. at 796-800.
256. Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 436 (1999); Anthony DiSarro,
Freeze Frame: The Supreme Court’s Reaffirmation of the Substantive Principles of Preliminary
Instructions, 47 GONZ. L. REV. 51, 94-95 (2011).
257. See generally Noah, supra note 17.
258. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 3 (1999); California v. Roy, 519 U.S. 2, 3 (1996);
Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 418.
259. Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263, 263 (1989) (noting that majority opinion is per
curiam and that only Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun joined Justice Scalia’s separate
opinion).
260. Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 229 (1999).
261. Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 785 (2001).
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concern than the majority for a relatively lesser role for the jury.262 Finally,
they found themselves on the opposite side of Justices Scalia, Thomas, and
Ginsburg in the sentencing cases as well.263
On the other hand, Justice Breyer and Justice Kennedy did join Justices
Scalia and Thomas in dissent in Smith v. Texas (Smith II).264 In Smith II,
they defended a trial court’s death penalty sentencing instructions that
included the nullification instruction at issue in Penry II.265 However,
Smith II was largely concerned with the preservation of the argument that
the nullification instruction was an inadequate cure to the lack of
consideration of mitigating circumstances, rather than the propriety of
nullification. This renders Smith II of dubious value in predicting the votes
of Justices Breyer and Kennedy.266
Assuming Justices Thomas, Breyer, and Kennedy’s acceptance of
harmless error in instructional error cases, and Justices Breyer and
Kennedy’s relatively unsympathetic response to the jury’s potentially
lessened role in cases like Jones and Apprendi, this would leave Justices
Scalia and Ginsburg in a presumptive deficit in garnering the necessary
votes to recognize the right to nullify. Giving the right to nullify the benefit
of the doubt, and supposing the tally would now be two against recognizing
the right to nullify (Justices Kennedy and Breyer), and three in favor
(Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Ginsburg), that would leave the four newer
Justices on the Court left to decide the issue.
5.

Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Alito,
Sotomayor, and Kagan

Unfortunately for proponents of jury nullification, the other four
Justices on the current Court are unlikely to vote to overrule Sparf. Justices
Roberts and Alito may be considered in some ways as conservative as
Justices Thomas and Scalia, but they are not viewed as pure originalists.267
262. The majority in Jones likely saw the dissent as giving short shrift to the role of the jury.
Jones, 526 U.S. at 242-52. The dissent, though, would disagree, as it believes that the jury’s role
was not “unconstitutionally diminished” because it still resolved the “gravamen of the offense.”
Id. at 271 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
263. Cunningham v. California, 548 US. 270, 273 (2007); Booker v. United States, 543 U.S.
220, 225 (2005); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 297 (2004); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530
U.S.466, 468 (2000).
264. 550 U.S. 297 (2007).
265. Smith, 550 U.S. at 316 (Alito, J., dissenting); Penry, 532 U.S. at 782.
266. See generally Smith, 550 U.S. 297.
267. See generally Charles W. “Rocky” Rhoes, What Conservative Constitutional
Revolution? Moderating Five Degrees of Judicial Conservatism After Six Years of the Roberts
Court, 64 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 22-29 (2011) (finding that Justices Roberts and Alito have some
affinity for originalism, but also rely on other theories of adjudication). “Chief Justice Roberts
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In criminal cases, they are more likely to be conservative in the sense of pro
law-and-order. For instance, the pair is more likely to find harmless error
applicable than Justice Scalia.268 Evidence of their voting patterns is not as
thorough as the five Justices already noted, but Chief Justice Roberts and
Justice Alito were present to cast their votes in Cunningham, and somewhat
surprisingly split their vote.269 Whereas Justice Alito joined with Justices
Kennedy and Breyer, indicating a possible dearth of support from him for
any pro-nullification faction, Chief Justice Roberts sided with Justice
Ginsburg and the majority, extending the Apprendi line of cases.270 But
concluding that Chief Justice Robert’s vote was strictly, or even largely,
based on considerations of nullification is likely a rash assumption. It
seems unlikely that the Chief Justice, who likely values the institutional
credibility and durability of the Court more than any other member, would
overturn the long understanding that nullification is illegal.271
possesses some sympathy for originalism, as he expressed in his confirmation hearing, but his has
not been a historically frozen search for the original understanding. Instead, he has tempered the
original understanding with judicial precedent and sometimes American traditions . . . .”; “Justice
Alito is attracted to originalism, as he testified during his confirmation hearing. . . . But his
jurisprudence to date has not sought a historically frozen original understanding.”) (footnote
omitted). For an example of Justice Alito bucking originalism, see, e.g., United States v. Jones,
132 S. Ct. 945, 958-62 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) (criticizing the majority’s
originalist approach as inconsistent with precedent and unworkable); see also Orin S. Kerr,
Response, Defending Equilibrium-Adjustment, 125 HARV. L. REV. F. 84, 88 (2011). For an
example of Chief Justice Roberts doing the same, see, e.g., Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507,
2520-21 (2011) (Thomas, J., dissenting), in which Justice Roberts did not join the portion of the
dissent privileging originalism over precedent.
268. See United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 142, 152 (2006); see also Kenneth
Duvall, The Defendant Was Not Heard . . . Now What?: Prejudice Analysis, Harmless Error
Review, and the Right to Testify, 35 HAMLINE L. REV. 279, 318 (2012).
269. Cunningham, 548 U.S. at 273.
270. Id. (collecting cases).
271. Granted, Chief Justice Roberts has overruled precedent before, probably most famously
in reaching the Citizens United decision. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct.
876, 913 (2010), overruling Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990). Sparf,
clocking in at over a century, and with decades of precedent building up to its result, stands on a
wholly different footing. Some might answer that Citizens United overruled far more than Austin,
as Congress had placed special limit on corporate campaign spending since 1907. Citizens
United, 130 S. Ct. at 930 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Even if Justice Stevens is right that the
majority was turning its back on much more than two decades of history, and that regulating
campaign finance had been going on for over a century, the majority could at least note that the
issues in corporate speech and campaign finance have been evolving for years as a practical and a
legal matter. Id. at 912-13 (majority opinion). In contrast, the issue of jury nullification remains
as straightforward as ever, and overruling Sparf would not be justified on any changes in
circumstance or doctrine over time, as the propriety of nullification remains a moral judgment.
Moreover, the Chief Justice’s decision to vote with the liberal wing of the Court in upholding
President Obama’s signature healthcare legislation has roundly been considered a move motivated
by a desire to preserve the legitimacy of the Court above other considerations. See, e.g., David L.
Franklin, Why Did Roberts Do It? To Save the Court, SLATE (June 28, 2012, 3:51 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2012/06/john_roberts_broke_with
_conservatives_to_preserve_the_supreme_court_s_legitimacy.html.
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Meanwhile, just as Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito are not
conservatives in the mold of Justices Thomas and Scalia, Justices
Sotomayor and Kagan are not necessarily liberals in the mold of Justice
Ginsburg – the Court’s liberal most likely to support the jury’s right to
nullify. For instance, in Bullcoming v. New Mexico,272 Justices Thomas and
Kagan joined in Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion holding that the
Confrontation Clause does not permit the prosecution to introduce a
forensic laboratory report containing a testimonial certification through the
in-court testimony of an analyst who did not sign the certification or
personally perform or observe the performance of the test reported in the
certification.273 Yet the pair did not join the last part of the majority
opinion in an apparent effort to mitigate the effects of the opinion on the
State and leave the door open to a more State-friendly result in similar, but
possibly distinguishable, cases.274 Moreover, the pair joined the other
liberals on the Court in Citizens United,275 emphasizing the primacy of
precedent,276 rather than the majority’s prime focus on a correct result, at
least from its point of view.277 It seems highly unlikely that Justices
Sotomayer and Kagan would seek to resurrect an originalist understanding
of the jury’s right to nullify in the face of such long-standing precedent as
Sparf. Justice Kagan may have remarked that “we are all originalists” in
her confirmation hearings,278 but as we have seen, even originalists like
Justice Scalia have their limits, such as when precedent is over a century
old.
VII. CONCLUSION
Jurists will continue to disagree about nullification’s proper role in
trials, just as they will continue to disagree over the exact role that
nullification played historically. This disagreement, though, is merely

272. 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011).
273. See Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2709.
274. Id. at 2721-22; see also Duvall, supra note 268, at 319-20.
275. See generally Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 876.
276. Id. at 930, 938 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Relying largely on individual dissenting
opinions, the majority blazes through our precedents, overruling or disavowing a body of case law
. . . . The final principle of judicial process that the majority violates is the most transparent:
stare decisis.” (emphasis in original) (citations omitted)). The dissent does eventually join battle
with the majority’s originalist understandings of free speech regarding corporate entities, but only
long after it has put precedent first. Id. at 948.
277. Id. at 912 (Kennedy, J., majority opinion) (“[S]tare decisis is a principle of policy and
not a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision.” (emphasis in original) (alteration in
original) (citation omitted)).
278. See The Nomination of Elena Kagan to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of
the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 62 (2010).
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academic, as nullification is undoubtedly illegal at this point in time, as
juries are shirking their legal duty to follow and apply the law when they
nullify. If courts, led by the Supreme Court, intend to follow through with
this rule of law, then the consequences are evident, if unnerving: criminal
juries should be regulated just as civil juries are regulated. The use of such
jury control devices as directed verdicts and special verdicts may seem
anathema to most – given the hallowed place that the jury continues to hold
in the United States. However, given that the only possible justification for
banning such control devices is to protect the power to nullify, the absence
of these mechanisms has made no doctrinal sense since Sparf.
It is likely the Supreme Court will avoid confronting this issue.
Instead, the Court will allow the uneasy balance to continue, wherein juries
are told to apply the law as instructed and yet, are free to ignore the law
because of the lack of oversight and direction. That the jury has the power,
but not right, to nullify, is an illogical, insincere, and maybe even
unnecessary compromise, yet it has lasted for over a century now, and looks
to continue into the foreseeable future. Similarly, the few instances of the
recognition of nullification in our system also appear here to stay as part of
the de facto settlement between the two factions. However, should the
Court decide to face the fact that under the Sixth Amendment, the
prohibition on jury control devices merely serves to safeguard a banned
practice, then the Court must either follow Sparf through to its inevitable
conclusion and allow jury control mechanisms in criminal trials in order to
purge an anachronistic practice; or, overrule Sparf in recognition of
nullification’s place in the Sixth Amendment so that the prohibition on jury
control devices becomes justified. Either course of action – openly
recognizing the jury’s right to nullify or openly recognizing the judge’s
right to direct verdicts – would be a shock, until one realizes both scenarios
would be cause for surprise, indicating our collective cognitive dissonance
on the issue. This author hopes this issue will be resolved one way or the
other, but, the middle path is the most comfortable one, and the likely path
for the foreseeable future.

